Maryland and Supreme Court Treaty Interpretation: Paradox and Dilemma by Malawer, Stuart S.
University of Baltimore Law Review
Volume 2
Issue 1 Winter 1972 Article 4
1972
Maryland and Supreme Court Treaty
Interpretation: Paradox and Dilemma
Stuart S. Malawer
University of Baltimore School of Law
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in
University of Baltimore Law Review by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@University of Baltimore School of Law. For more information,
please contact snolan@ubalt.edu.
Recommended Citation
Malawer, Stuart S. (1972) "Maryland and Supreme Court Treaty Interpretation: Paradox and Dilemma," University of Baltimore Law
Review: Vol. 2: Iss. 1, Article 4.
Available at: http://scholarworks.law.ubalt.edu/ublr/vol2/iss1/4




The increase in the quantity of litigation involving issues of
international law in the federal and state courts and before
administrative bodies has been very great. This has been a
consequence of many varied factors-increased foreign expro-
priations of U.S. owned foreign property; greater foreign direct
investments in the United States. With the advent of investment
liberalization in Japan, the expansion of the European Common
Market, and the trade expgnsion by the United States with both
the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China, an
increase in litigation involving international law issues in the
courts and the administrative agencies in the United States is
inevitable.'
I. Introduction-A Dilemma and a Paradox.
For the Maryland practitioner, treaty law is a field not well known,
but of rapidly growing significance. The development in Baltimore of
modernized port facilities, rapidly developing international departments
of banking, insurance and industrial concerns, solicitation of European
and foreign direct investment in the State, and proposed state
legislation to parallel the new federal Domestic International Sales
Corporation as well as the scheduled completion of the new Maryland
World Trade Center, warrants an analysis of treaty law.
The most common rule of treaty law enunciated by the United
States Supreme Court is that treaties are to be broadly construed. What
is known as the "broad rule" of treaty interpretation is stated as
follows: when a treaty provision remains ambiguous after the
application of all other rules of interpretation it is to be broadly
construed. This rule is distinct from the "ordinary and natural meaning
rule" that requires terms to be construed in the ordinary and natural
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meaning. When the ordinary meaning of a term is not clear, then one
applies the broad rule of construction. In this sense the latter rule is a
residual rule of interpretation. This article is a comparative jurispruden-
tial analysis of the highest court of the State of Maryland and the
United States Supreme Court.
A case study of interpretation in Maryland indicates that while
declaring to follow a broad rule of treaty construction, Maryland
follows a restrictive rule. This raises doubts not only as to the existence
of a broad rule of treaty interpretation in customary international law,
but serious Constitutional law dilemmas in the context of federal-state
judicial relations.
Under Constitutional law, interpretation of treaties is a federal
question. State courts are not free to interpret a treaty different from
the Supreme Court. A corollary of this rule is that state courts are to
use the .same means on rules of treaty interpretation as declared by the
Supreme Court.2 Treaty interpretation is not considered to fall within
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins.'
The analysis of the Supreme Court Jurisprudence indicates that the
treaty interpretation cases proclaim a need to adhere to a broad rule of
treaty interpretations, as first enunciated in Shanks v. Dupont.4
However, a dual paradox exists. First, the rule is not clearly
formulated: in some cases the Court referred to the broad interpreta-
tion of ambiguous treaty provisions to effectuate private rights: other
cases refer to upholding State equality and national sovereignty.
Second, regardless of the lack of a clear statement of the rule, the Court
never exclusively relied upon the rule to determine a case.
Two additional observations are as follows. The cases decided by the
Supreme Court treated essentially nominal issues in the sphere of
interstate relations of estate succession, Indian treaties or extradition.
Again, the Court has not in fact construed provisions in the broadest
sense. The Court looked at other treaties and preparatory work to
arrive at the ordinary meaning of treaty provisions.
II. Maryland Jurisprudence-Restrictive Interpretation-A Dilemma.
Chryssikos v. DeMarco (1919)' involved the interpretation of the
2. Where the Constitution does not vest exclusive jurisdiction in the Federal Government,
and where Congress has not acted to "occupy the field," a state may prescribe and en-
force rules of law involving matters of significant concern to foreign relations.. .. How-
ever, the rules of the foreign relations law of the United States [are] ... matters as to
which state law either is constitutionally required to conform to Federal law ... or con-
forms to it in practice.... RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 2, comment d at 7-8 (1965) [Hereinafter cited as RESTATEMENT].
3. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In relation to the act of state doctrine, Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 425 (1964), stated, "It seems fair to assume that the Court
did not have rules like the act of state doctrine in mind when it decided Erie R. Co. v.
Tompkins." It. can similarly be argued that questions of treaty interpretation were not
in mind when the Court decided Erie.
4. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 150 (1830).
5. 134 Md. 533, 107 A. 358 (1919).
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Consular Convention of 1903 between Greece and the United States.6
The plaintiff, a representative of the Consulate of Greece, was appealing
an order of the Orphan's Court of Baltimore City. The appeal asked the
court to appoint the Counsul as administrator.
The intestate, a Greek citizen, died in Baltimore where he resided,
leaving $1,800 in a Baltimore City bank. The deceased left, as survivors
in Greece, his parents, sisters, and a brother. Application for the letters
of administration was made by defendant (not a relative) to the
Orphan's Court and the letters were issued. The Consul, in pursuance of
the existing treaty between the United States and Greece, asserted that
he was entitled to the letters of administration.
The court declared that it was not required to give a strained
interpretation to the treaty:
We are not required, however, to give a strained construction to
the language of a treaty, or place an unreasonable interpretation
upon it, for the purposes of securing to foreigners privileges
which are denied citizens of this country.7
Article XI of the Treaty contained a most-favored nation clause:
Article XI. In the case of the death of any citizen of the United
States in Greece, or of a Greek subject in the United States,
without having any known heirs or testamentary executors by
him appointed, the competent local authorities shall give
information of the circumstance to the consular officers of the
nation to which the deceased belongs, in order that the
necessary information may be immediately forwarded to the
parties interested. In all that relates to the administration and
settlement of estates, the consular officers of the high
contracting parties shall have the same rights and privileges as
those accorded in the United States of America and Greece,
respectively, to the consular officers of the most favored
nation.8 (Emphasis added).
The foreign consul asserted that because of the most-favored-nation
clause in the Greece-U.S. Treaty, Article 14 of the U.S.-Swedish
Treaty9 is applicable:
In the event of any citizens of either of the two Contracting
Parties dying without will or testament, in the territory of the
other Contracting Party, the consul-general, consul, vice-consul
general, or vice-consul of the nation to which the deceased may
belong, or, in his absence the representative of such consul-
general, consul, vice-consul general, or vice-consul, shall, so far
6. Nov. 19, 1902, 33 Stat. 2122 (1903-05), T.S. No. 424.
7. 134 Md. at 535, 107 A. at 359.
8. 33 Stat. 2122, 2129 (1903-05).
9. Consular Convention with Sweden, June 1, 1910, 37 Stat. 1479 (1912), T.S. No. 557.
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as the laws of each country will permit, and pending the
appointment of an administrator and until letters of administra-
tion have been granted, take charge of the property left by the
deceased for the benefit of his lawful heirs and creditors, and,
moreover, have the right to be appointed as administrator of
such estate.1 0 (Emphasis added).
The court thus interpreted the term, "so far as the laws of each
country will permit", in a restrictive manner.
That language was inserted to enable the Consul-General or
other persons named, to take possession before he was
appointed administrator, but only "so far as the laws of each
country will permit.''
The court refused to revoke the letters of administration and to
extend them to the consular officer of Greece:
To permit a representative of a foreign government to set aside
the provisions of testamentary laws, and take from the probate
courts, orphans' courts, or by whatever name they be known,
the power to determine who shall administer upon estates,
when otherwise it would be in the discretion of the courts,
would be conferring broad powers on him, and yet if the
contention of the appellant is sustained that is what it amounts
to.' 2
The court suggested a restrictive interpretation was necessary, for if
the Nations intended to entitle the administration of the estates of
citizens of one country dying in another exclusively to the consul of
the foreign nation, they would have explicitly stated it.
It would not be just to assume that in making a treaty with a
foreign country laws of the different States were intended to be
repealed or ignored, in the absence of express language
(emphasis added) or clear implication showing such intent,
especially such as testamentary laws, which are necessary and
exist in every State, although they differ in some particulars.' 3
The Maryland court required all treaty rights as they related to
individuals to be explicitly granted in the treaty.
So, although courts are bound by treaties and must not place a
construction on them which would alter, add to, take from or
in any way change them, or be controlled by the mere
inconvenience of the provisions, if clear and unambiguous, they
10. Id. at 1487-88.
11. 134 Md. at 544, 107 A. at 362.
12. Id. at 539, 107 A. at 360.
13. Id.
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can, in seeking to ascertain the meaning of provisions which are
not free from doubt, take into consideration the results which
would follow a construction urged upon them.1 4 (Emphasis
added).
The court did not consider these contested provisions to be free from
doubt. The court held that the treaty provisions providing for the
appointment of the consul to take charge of the property of the
intestate did not include the appointment of the consul as an
administrator. The court argued that the law of the country was
ambiguous.' 5 Therefore, the courts did not want to give ambiguous
treaty provisions a strained construction or unreasonable interpreta-
tion.' 6
The court clearly construed the ambiguous treaty provisions
restrictively. While the Supreme Court had never decided a case entirely
on the basis of either a broad or restrictive theory of treaty
interpretation, the Maryland Court of Appeals decided this case on the
basis of the restrictive rule of treaty interpretation. It never cited any of
the language of the Supreme Court as to the need for liberal
construction of treaties.
In Schneider v. Hawkins (1940)' ' the Maryland courts once again
adhered to a restrictive rule of interpretation. The plaintiff, a
German Consul, appealed from an order of the Orphans' Court of
Baltimore County. The court refused his application for letters of
administration for the estate of a German national who had died
intestate. The plaintiff argued that he was entitled to the letters by
virtue of his office under the terms of the Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular Rights between the U.S. and Germany. 8 The
consul claimed that he had a paramount right to administration by
virtue of the clause of the treaty which provided the following:
Article XXIV .... In case of the death of a national of either
of the High Contracting Parties without will or testament, in the
territory of the other High Contracting Party, the consular
officer of the State of which the deceased was a national and
within whose district the deceased made his home at the time of
death, shall, so far as the laws of the country permit and
pending the appointment of an administrator and until letters
of administration have been granted, be deemed qualified to
take charge of the property left by the decedent for the
preservation and protection of the same. Such consular officer
shall have the right to be appointed as administrator within the
discretion of a tribunal or other agency controlling the
14. Id. at 539-40, 107 A. at 360-61.
15. Id. at 540, 107 A. at 361.
16. Id. at 539-40, 107 A. at 360-61.
17. 179 Md. 21, 16 A.2d 861 (1940).
18. Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132 (1925-27), T.S. No. 725.
19721
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administration of estates provided the laws of the place where
the estate is administered so permit.' " (Emphasis added).
The court made reference to Chryssikos and applied the same
restrictive interpretation to the phrase, "so far as the laws of each
country will permit." 2 0 It refused to reverse the Orphans' Court ruling,
which denied the consular officer possession of deceased's letter. ' The
court argued that the treaty provision required discretion and did not
mandate states to issue letters of administration automatically to
foreign consul. 2
When applied to public officials, "discretion" is the power
conferred upon them by law to act officially under certain
circumstances according to the dictates of their own judgment
and conscience, and uncontrolled by the judgment or con-
science of others. 3
The court also stated:
The prevailing view is that the provisions of the treaties are "not
so mandatory as to require that state laws regarding the
administration of estates should be superseded." 4
As in the previous case, the court clearly adhered to a restrictive rule
of interpreting the ambiguous treaty provisions.
III. Supreme Court Jurisprudence-Broad Rule of Treaty Interpreta-
tion-A Paradox
A. From Shanks to Miller (1830-1968).
Shanks v. Dupont (1830)2 1 involved the claim of a British subject to
lands in the United States owned by her father, a British citizen who
had died intestate in South Carolina. South Carolina law prohibited
foreign nationals from holding title or interest in realty. The plaintiff
asserted she was entitled to claim the property under Article 9 of the
1794 Jay Treaty (U.S. and Great Britain). 2 6 Article 9 stated:
British subjects who now hold lands in the territories of the
United States, and American citizens who now hold lands in the
19. Id. at 2153.
20. Chryssikos v. DeMarco, 134 Md. 533, 540, 107 A. 358, 361 (1919).
21. Schneider v. Hawkins, 179 Md. 21, 29, 16 A.2d 861, 865 (1940).
22. Id. at 25, 16 A.2d at 864.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 27, 16 A.2d at 865. The court quoted from 100 A.L.R. 1531 (1936).
25. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 150 (1830).
26. Treaty with Great Britain on Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, 8
Stat. 116 (1855), T.S. No. 105.
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dominion of His Majesty, shall continue to hold them according
to the nature and tenure of their respective estates and titles
therein; ... and that neither they nor their heirs or assigns shall,
so far as may respect the said lands, and the legal remedies
incident thereto, be regarded as aliens.2 7
The defendant argued that since the plaintiff's -mother was a U.S.
citizen and the plaintiff was born in the U.S., the plaintiff should be
considered a citizen of the U.S. and not a "British subject" under the
terms of Article 9. Thus, she should be bound by the laws of the State
and the treaty should have no effect. The plaintiff argued that since her
father was a British citizen and she was living in Great Britain, she
ought to be considered a "British subject" under the treaty.
The Court in holding for the plaintiff declared that the terms of the
treaty should be construed within the spirit and intent of the treaty,
and it was the intent of Great Britain to protect the rights of all British
subjects holding land in America from the disability of alienage in
respect to descent and sale of property. The Court stated:
If the treaty admits of two interpretations, and one is limited,
and the other liberal; one which will further, and the other
exclude private rights; why should not the most liberal
exposition be adopted?2 8
However, it went on to state its conclusion:
It seems to us, then, that all British born subjects, whose
allegiance Great Britain has never renounced, ought, upon
general principles of interpretation, to be held within the intent,
as they certainly are within the words, of the treaty of 1794.29
(Emphasis added).
The Court considered that the terms in question were clear, thus
precluding resort to the broad rule of treaty construction. The Court
considered the broad or liberal rule of treaty construction as either
27. Id. at 122.
28. 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) at 155.
29. Id. at 156. The Court's specific conclusion follows:
The object of the British government must have been, to protect all her subjects
holding lands in America, from the disability of alienage, in respect to descents
and sales. The class of American loyalists could, at least, in her eyes, have been
in as much favor as any other; there is nothing in our public policy which is more
unfavorable to them than to other British subjects. After the peace of 1783, we
had no right or interest in future confiscation; and the effect of alienage was the
same in respect to us, whether the British subject was a native of Great Britain or
of the colonies. This part of the stipulation, then, being for the benefit of British
subjects who became aliens by the events of the war; there is no reason why all
persons should not be embraced in it, who sustained the character of British sub-
jects, although we might also have treated them as American citizens.
Id. at 155.
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expanding or restricting the rights of the individuals, rather than the
sovereignty of the nation-states. The Court by its formulation of the
rule emphasized the protection of the rights of individuals rather than
of states. This analysis illustrates the broad rule of treaty construction
as a rule that encroaches upon the sovereignty of a state. The rule is
utilized to interpret ambiguous provisions against the objecting state,
by extending its obligations further than what were clearly and
unambiguously stated. The Court's statement of the rule in this case
might not fall within this definition. The Court's statement is
most correctly characterized as a misstatement in the terms of how it
has been developed by subsequent jurisprudence.
Hauenstein v. Lynham (1879)"0 illustrates the Court's use of the
broad rule of interpretation merely as dictum, since it was not
necessary to involve the rule at all. The intestate died in Virginia in
1861. His property was sold under the State's escheat laws. The heir of
the intestate, a national of Switzerland, filed a petition for the proceeds
of the sale relying on Article V of the U.S.-Swiss Confederation Treaty
of 1850.' ' Article V stated:
The foregoing provisions shall be applicable to real estate situate
within the States of the American Union, or within the cantons
of the Swiss Confederation, in which foreigners shall be entitled
to hold or inherit real estate.
But in case real estate situated within the territories of one of
the contracting parties should fall to a citizen of the other
party, who, on account of his being an alien, could not be
permitted to hold such property in the State or in the canton in
which it may be situated, there shall be accorded to the said
heir, or other successor, such term as the laws of the State or
canton will permit to sell such property; he shall be at liberty at
all times to withdraw and export the proceeds thereof without
difficulty, and without paying to the government any other
charges than those which, in a similar case, would be paid by an
inhabitant of the country in which the real estate may be
situated.3 2 (Emphasis added).
The State argued that " . . . the State, having fixed no time within
which this must be done, it cannot be done at all, and that the entire
provision thus becomes a nullity, and is as if it were not."3" The Court
states, "The terms of the limitation imply clearly that some time, and
not that none, was to be allowed." 3 4
30. 100 U.S. 483 (1879).
31. Treaty with Swiss Confederation on Commerce, Friendship, Establishments, and
Surrender of Criminals, Nov. 25, 1850, 11 Stat. 587 (1855-59), T.S. No. 353.
32. Id. at 590-91.
33. 100 U.S. at 487. This is the argument of the State as understood by the Court.
34. Id.
[Vol. 2
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Where a treaty admits of two constructions, one restrictive as to
the rights, that may be claimed under it, and the other liberal,
the latter is to be preferred.3 s
The Court clearly never reached the application of the broad rule of
treaty construction. The ordinary meaning of "at all times" was "some
time" and it could not be interpreted in any other manner; this again
illustrates that one of the earliest cases did not rely exclusively upon
the broad rule to decide the merits of the dispute.
Geofrey v. Riggs (1890 )3 6 involved the right of a French citizen to
take land in the District of Columbia by descent from a citizen of the
U.S. The question presented was whether the District of Columbia was
one of the "States of the Union" within the meaning of that term as
used in Article 7 of the Consular Convention with France of 1853. 3 '
The Court held that the French citizen was entitled to the land, thus
declaring the District of Columbia to be a state of the U.S. within the
meaning of the treaty. The Court called attention to the accepted rule
of interpretation and stated the following:
It is a general principle of construction with respect to treaties
that they shall be liberally construed, so as to carry out the
apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and
reciprocity between them. As they are contracts between
independent nations, in their construction words are to be
taken in their ordinary meaning, as understood in the public law
of nations, and not in any artificial or special sense impressed
upon them by local law, unless such restricted sense is clearly
intended. And it has been held by this court that where a treaty
admits of two constructions, one restrictive of rights that may
be claimed under it and the other favorable to them, the latter
is to be preferred.3 (Emphasis added).
In this case, the Court emphasized the necessity to interpret treaties
liberally in order to "secure the equality and reciprocity between (the
parties)." 3  The Court redefined the rule of restrictive interpretation
by emphasizing the protection of the States, rather than of the
individuals.4 0 On the merits the Court stated:
To ensure reciprocity in the terms of the treaty, it would be
necessary to hold that by "States of the Union" is meant all the
political communities exercising legislative powers in the
35. Id.
36. 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
37. Feb. 23, 1853, 10 Stat. 992 (1851-55), T.S. No. 92.
38. 133 U.S. at 271-72.
39. Id. at 271.
40. Id.
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country, embracing not only those political communities which
constitute the United States, but also those communities which
constitute the political bodies known as Territories and the
District of Columbia. 4 '
The Court apparently decided the case according to the ordinary
meaning of the term "States of the Union" with no meaningful analysis
of the impact on the sovereignty of the foreign state. Clearly, defining
the disputed term to include the District of Columbia had no significant
consequences on the obligations assumed by France.
Tucker v. Alexandroff (1902)"2 involved the interpretation of
Article Nine of the Treaty of Navigation and Commerce of 1832
between the United States and Russia.4 The Court had to determine
whether the petitioner was subject to extradition under the treaty as a
deserter. Article Nine of the Treaty read as follows:
The said Consuls, Vice Consuls and Commercial Agents, are
authorized to require the assistance of the local authorities, for
the search, arrest, detention and imprisonment of the deserters
from the ships of war and merchant vessels of their country.
For this purpose they shall apply to the competent tribunals,
judges and officers, and shall, in writing, demand said deserters,
proving by the exhibition of the registers of the vessels, the rolls
of the crews, or by other official documents, that such
individuals formed part of the crews; and, this reclamation
being thus substantiated, the surrender shall not be refused.4
(Emphasis added).
The petitioner argued that the "ship of war" was not present in this
case because the ship was still under construction and outfitting in the
United States.4 s The Court rejected this plea by interpreting 'ships of
war' as being those ships in their final stages of construction and
outfitting, which included the transfer of title and launch of the ship.4 6
Even though the Court merely relied upon the ordinary meaning of the
contested provisions after analyzing other treaties, it referred to the
broad rule of treaty construction.4
The treaty should be liberally interpreted in this particular to
carry out the intent of the parties, since if a foreign government
may not send details of men to take possession of vessels built
here, without danger of losing their entire command by
desertion, we must either cease building them or foreign
41. Id.
42. 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
43. Dec. 18, 1832, 8 Stat. 444 (1855), T.S. No. 299.
44. Id. at 448.
45. 183 U.S. at 437-38.
46. Id. at 439.
47. Id. at 437.
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governments must send special ships of their own with crews
ordered to take possession of them.4
Justices Gray, Fuller, Harlan and White, dissenting, clearly empha-
sized that the majority decision was in restriction of the right of the
petitioner. The decision itself never discussed the broad or restrictive
rule in the context of expanding or limiting the obligations of either of
the parties to the treaty. The decision increased the obligations owed to
Russia without significant detriment to the United States. The
dissenting opinion had stated the following:
It was argued, however, at the bar, if this case did not come
within the treaty or the statute, the United States were bound,
by the comity of nations, to take active steps for the arrest of
Alexandroff, and for his surrender to the Russian authorities.
But this position cannot be maintained.
The treaties of the United States with Russia and with most
of the nations of the world must be considered as defining and
limiting the authority of the government of the United States to
take active steps for the arrest and surrender of deserting
seamen.
These treaties must be construed so as to carry out, in the
utmost good faith, the stipulations therein made with foreign
nations. But neither the executive nor the judiciary of the
United States has authority to take affirmative action, beyond
the fair scope of the provisions of the treaty, to subject persons
within the territory of the United States to the jurisdiction of
another nation.4" (Emphasis added).
In the often cited and well known Asakura v. Seattle (1924)' ° the
Court ruled that a Japanese national who had been admitted to the U.S.
could participate in the business of pawnbroking, 5' as this business
constituted "trade" within the meaning of the 1911 treaty between the
U.S. and Japan..5  The treaty is considered to override an inconsistent
and subsequent municipal ordinance. The Court, in an explanation of
its decision, stated:
Treaties are to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit, and,
when two constructions are possible, one restrictive of rights
that may be claimed under it, and the other favorable to them
the latter is to be preferred.' 3
48. Id. at 446.
49. Id. at 466-67.
50. 265 U.S. 332 (1924).
51. Id. at 343.
52. Treaty with Japan on Commerce and Navigation, Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504 (1912),
T.S. No. 558.
53. 265 U.S. at 342.
1972]
Baltimore Law Review
The relevant treaty provision stated the following:
The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties
shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of
the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease
and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to
employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and
commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident to
or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or
subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations
there established.
The citizens or subjects of each ... shall receive, in the
territories of the other, the most constant protection and
security for their persons and property ..... . (Emphasis
added).
The Court interpreted the contested treaty provision by claiming it is
not to be restrictively interpreted.' The Court argued that treaties are
to be broadly construed in providing for private rights. When
considered with the prior case' 6 it is clear that the Court discussed the
protection of private rights, and sometimes, the protection of sovereign
rights as being upheld by a broad rule of treaty interpretation. The
Court has not been clear even on its formulation of the broad rule of
treaty interpretation. 7
The Court, nevertheless, construed the term "trade" to include
pawnbroking, as within the ordinary definition of trade. The Court had
no trouble in reaching such a conclusion.
Jordan v. Tashiro (1928)"8 also involved the 1911 Treaty between
the United States and Japan.' ' The Court held that Japanese nationals
in California were entitled to form a corporation to construct and
operate a hospital.6 The Court referred to Article I of the treaty,
which stated:
The citizens or subjects of each of the High Contracting Parties
shall have liberty to enter, travel and reside in the territories of
the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to own or lease
54. 37 Stat. 1504 (1912).
55. The language of the treaty is comprehensive. The phrase "to carry on trade" is broad.
That it is not to be given a restricted meaning is plain. The clauses "to own or lease ...
shops,... to lease land for.., commercial purposes, and generally to do anything inci-
dent to or necessary for trade," and "shall receive ... the most constant protection and
security for their ... property..." all go to show the intention of the parties that the
citizens or subjects of either shall have liberty in the territory of the other to engage in all
kinds and classes of business that are or reasonably may be embraced within the mean-
ing of the word "trade" as used in the treaty.
265 U.S. at 342.
56. Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424 (1902).
57. Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332,-342 (1924).
58. 278 U.S. 123 (1928).
59. Feb. 21, 1911, 37 Stat. 1504 (1912), T.S. No. 558.
60. 278 U.S. at 129.
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and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to
employ agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and
commercial purposes, and generally do anything incident to or
necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or
subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations
there established. 6' (Emphasis added).
The Court stated that the "obligations should be liberally con-
strued."6 2 Indicating that the obligations between nations are to be
construed in good faith, the Court remarked:
The principles which should control the diplomatic relations of
nations, and the good faith of treaties as well, require that their
obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the
apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and
reciprocity between them. Upon like ground, where a treaty
fairly admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights
that may be claimed under it and the other enlarging them, the
more liberal construction is to be preferred.6 3
The Court went on to state:
Moreover, a construction which concedes the authority of
Japanese subjects to operate a hospital but would deny to them
an appropriate means of controlling so much of the earth's
surface as is indispensable to its operation, does not comport
with a reasonable, to say nothing of a liberal, construction.6 4
The Court argued its interpretation was reasonable and never had to
reach the doctrine of liberal treaty interpretation.
Nielsen v. Johnson (1929)65 involved a Danish national who died
intestate in Iowa. He left his mother, a Danish national resident in
Denmark, as his sole heir. According to a statute of the State of Iowa, a
ten percent inheritance tax was to be imposed on any estate passing to
a nonresident alien. The Danish national contended that Article 7 of
the treaty of 1826 with Denmark prevented this discriminating tax
against the estate.6 6
61. 37 Stat. 1504 (1912).
62. 278 U.S. at 127.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 129.
The principle of liberal construction of treaties would be nullified if a grant of
enumerated privileges were held not to include the use of the usual methods
and instrumentalities of their exercise. Especially would this be the case where
the granted privileges relate to trade and commerce and the use of land for com-
mercial purposes.
Id. at 130.
65. 279 U.S. 47 (1929).
66. General Convention of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Denmark, April 26,
1826, 8 Stat. 340 (1855), T.S. No. 65, renewed, Convention with Denmark, April 11, 1867,
11 Stat. 719, 720 (1855-59), T.S. No. 67.
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The United States and his Danish Majesty mutually agree, that
no higher or other duties, charges, or taxes of any kind, shall be
levied in the territories or dominions of either party, upon any
personal property, money or effects, of their respective citizens
or subjects, on the removal of the same from their territories or
dominions reciprocally, either upon the inheritance of such
property, money, or effects, or otherwise, than are or shall be
payable in each State, upon the same, when removed by a
citizen or subject of such State respectively.6
The Supreme Court held that this treaty prevented the Danish
national from being subject to such a discriminating tax. The Court also
stated:
The narrow and restricted interpretation of the Treaty
contended for by respondent, while permissible and often
necessary in construing two statutes of the same legislative body
in order to give effect to both so far as is reasonably possible is
not consonant with the principles which are controlling in the
interpretation of treaties.6 8
The Court clearly considered that the provision in question was clear
after resorting to its history. The Court never had to rely upon the
broad rule of construction for its holding.
The history of Article 7 and references to its provisions in
diplomatic exchanges between the United States and Denmark
leave little doubt that its purpose was both to relieve the
citizens of each country from onerous taxes upon their
property within the other and to enable them to dispose of such
property, paying only such duties as are exacted of the
inhabitants of the place of its situs .....
Todok v. Union State Bank (1930)' 0 involved the interpretation of
Article Six of the 1783 Treaty between the United States and
Norway."
The subjects of the contracting parties in the respective states,
may freely dispose of their goods and effects (emphasis added)
either by testament, donation or otherwise, in favour of such
persons as they think proper; and their heirs in whatever place
they shall reside, shall receive the succession even ab intes-
67. 8 Stat. 340, 342 (1855).
68. 279 U.S. at 51.
69. Id. at 52.
70. 281 U.S. 449 (1930).
71. Treaty of Amity and Commerce with Sweden, April 3, 1783, 8 Stat. 60 (1855), T.S. No.
346, renewed, Treaty with Sweden, Sept. 4, 1816, 8 Stat. 232, 240 (1855), T.S. No. 347,
renewed, Treaty with Sweden and Norway, July 4, 1827, 8 Stat. 346, 354 (1855), T.S. No.
348.
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tato, either in person or by their attorney, without having oc-
casion to take out letters of naturalization. These inher-
itances, as well as the capitals and effects, which the subjects of
the two parties, in changing their dwelling, shall be desirous of
removing from the place of their abode, shall be exempted from
all duty called "droit de detraction" on the part of the
government of the two states respectively. But it is at the same
time agreed, that nothing contained in this article shall in any
manner derogate from the ordinances published in Sweden
against emigrations, or which may hereafter be published, which
shall remain in full force and vigour. The United States on their
part, or any of them, shall be at liberty to make respecting this
matter, such laws as they think proper.7 2
A citizen of Norway willed his property to a grantee who
subsequently conveyed it to the defendant. It was the plaintiff's
contention that the grantor did not have the right to will the property,
and thus, the property should pass accordingly to the intestate
succession laws of Norway. The defendant based his claim to the
property on Article 6.
The court declared that the question presented was one of
construction and hence concluded that the phrase, "fonds et bien"
(goods and effects) encompassed more in the French language than it
did in English, thus finding that the term included real estate. The court
stated:
"Treaties should receive a liberal interpretation to give effect to
their apparent purpose." '
The Court considered the contested term 'goods and effects' to
comprehend not only chattels but realty. It considered the French text
determinative of the definition, since civil law clearly permitted that
interpretation.7 4 The Court relied upon the other text of the treaty to
be determinative of the issue when the English text was not clear. The
Court never had to rely upon the broad rule of interpretation for its
holding.
Factor v. Laubenheimer (1933)" involved the interpretation of an
extradition treaty. It considered the broad rule of treaty interpretation
in the context of obligations between states.
In choosing between conflicting interpretations of a treaty
obligation, a narrow and restricted construction is to be avoided
72. 8 Stat. 60, 64 (1855).
73. 281 U.S. at 454.
74. The Court quoted J. STORY, CONFLICT OF LAWS 12 n.2 (7th ed. 1872): "The term 'biens'
in the sense of the civilians and continental jurists, comprehends not merely goods
and chattels as in the common law, but real estate". Id.
75. 290 U.S. 276 (1933).
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as not consonant with the principles deemed controlling in the
interpretation of international agreements. Considerations
which should govern the diplomatic relations between nations,
and the good faith of treaties, as well, require that their
obligations should be liberally construed so as to effect the
apparent intention of the parties to secure equality and
reciprocity between them. For that reason if a treaty fairly
admits of two constructions, one restricting the rights which
may be claimed under it, and the other enlarging it, the more
liberal construction is to be preferred.7 6
Bacardi Corp. v. Domenech (1940)" relied upon the clear meaning
of the treaty provisions involved while merely restating the all too often
repeated general statements as to liberal interpretation of treaties.
According to the accepted canon, we should construe the treaty
liberally to give effect to the purpose which animates it. Even
where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two constructions,
one restricting, the other enlarging, rights which may be claimed
under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be preferred.
7 
8
Kolovrat v. Oregon (1961)" involved two residents of Oregon who
died intestate leaving personal property they owned in that State. Their
only heirs and next of kin were residents and nationals of Yugoslavia.
The State claimed that the Yugoslavian relatives were ineligible to
inherit. It argued the property should be declared escheated to the
State. The Court held that the citizens of Yugoslavia were lawfully
entitled to inherit the personal property in Oregon under the terms of
the 1881 Treaty between the U.S. and Serbia (which is now part of
Yugoslavia)." 0 The Court stated the following:
This Court has many times set its face against treaty
interpretations that unduly restrict rights a treaty is adopted to
protect.8 '
The Court did not rely upon the broad rule when reaching its
conclusion. The problem was to determine whether or not Yugoslavia
76. Id. at 293-94.
77. 311 U.S. 150 (1940). See also, Valentine v. Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936), in which the
Court argued that it adhered to a broad rule of interpretation but interpreted the con-
tested treaty provisions restrictively in order to protect the rights of U.S. citizens.
78. 311 U.S. at 163.
79. 366 U.S. 187 (1961).
80. Treaty of Commerce with Serbia, Oct. 14, 1881, 22 Stat. 963 (1881-82), T.S. No. 319.
Officially recognized as still in effect at Agreement with Yugoslavia, July 19, 1948, 62
Stat. 2658, 2660 (1948), T.I.A.S. No. 1803, Art. 5.
81. 366 U.S. at 193.
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was providing reciprocity. The Court concluded it was so doing, in
view of Yugoslavia's adherence to the Bretton Woods Agreement.
8 3
Zschernig v. Miller (1968)8" concerned itself with the typical
intestate problem involving the taking of precedence of a treaty over
state law. It involved the disposition of the proceeds of the estate of an
Oregon resident who died intestate in 1962. The heirs were residents of
East Germany. The Court held that the 1923 Treaty of Friendship,
Commerce and Consular .Rights8 I took precedence over state law, and
accordingly the heirs were entitled to inherit. 8 6 The Court reached this
decision again while citing the usual dictum of broad treaty
construction, but concluding the ordinary meaning of the treaty
provisions were to be followed. Justice Harlan stated in his concurring
opinion:
This course of history, coupled with the general principle that
"where a provision of a treaty fairly admits of two construc-
tions, one restricting, the other enlarging, rights which may be
claimed under it, the more liberal interpretation is to be
preferred," leads in my opinion to the conclusion that Article
IV of the 1923 treaty should be construed as guaranteeing to
citizens of the contracting parties the right to inherit personal
property from a decedent who dies in his own country.8 7
The Court concluding by stating:
The Oregon law does, indeed, illustrate the dangers which are
involved if each State, speaking through its probate courts, is
permitted to establish its own foreign policy.' 8
IV. Conclusion-Paradox and Dilemma.
The analysis of Supreme Court jurisprudence and Maryland
jurisprudence leads to the following conclusions. One, the Supreme
Court on the level of a rather loose formulation of a rule proclaims a
broad rule of treaty interpretation but never exclusively relies upon it
to decide a case.8" Two, Maryland Court of Appeals jurisprudence
82. Id. at 198.
83. International Monetary Fund Agreement, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401 (1946), T.I.A.S.
No. 1501.
84. 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
85. Dec. 8, 1923, 44 Stat. 2132 (1925-27), T.S. No. 725.
86. 389 U.S. at 441.
87. Id. at 456-57. The Court distinguished earlier cases that it thought were too restrictive in
that they were tainted by the 'Cold War'. Id. at 435.
88. Id. at 441.
89. The RESTATEMENT argues that the distinction between broad or liberal rules of
construction is not useful. It is argued here that the Supreme Court says it adheres to
a broad rule of construction.
Liberal and strict construction. Statements are encountered in treatises, in-
ternational adjudications, and decisions of national courts (including those of the
United States) that international agreements should be interpreted liberally in
the light of their objectives. Other statements support "strict construction" for
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adheres to a restrictive rule of treaty interpretation and very rarely
mentions the Supreme Court doctrine. Three, in the context of
customary international law, United States jurisprudence does not
clearly favor a broad rule of treaty interpretation. Four, under United
States Constitutional law, there exists a serious issue that needs
corrective measures to be taken. Action is required by the legislature of
Maryland or by either the Congress or the Supreme Court to set firm
certain types of treaties, such as those ceding sovereignty or territory, or in-
volving possible conflicts with preexisting national law. This distinction is not
useful in the process of interpretation, since it either suggests a canon of exclu-
sionary application or merely states a conclusion without directing attention to
the factors involved in reaching it.
RESTATEMENT § 147, comment b at 452.
The RESTATEMENT rejects the value of canons of construction, not their existence.
It is argued that different courts adhere to different canons of construction as to broad
or restrictive rule of interpretation. The existence of customary international law is not
explicit as to the acceptance of either rule. RESTATEMENT § 147, Reporters' Notes 1 at
454-55.
The Supreme Court has decided a line of cases concerning the interpretation, and to
some measure the validity, of treaties concluded with the American Indians. An
analysis of them very strongly supports the following propositions. One, the Supreme
Court often adheres to a restrictive rule of treaty interpretation to uphold the sovereignty
of the State, when proclaiming the necessity of broad treaty interpretation. Two, these
cases are the closest the Supreme Court has come to discussing the juridical nature
and validity of duress on a treaty power. Since the Court never specifically heard the
argument, one must conclude that parties before the Court and the Court itself con-
sidered the argument invalid. Malawer, A New Concept of Consent and World Public
Order: 'Coerced Treaties' and the Convention on the Law of Treaties, 4 VAND. J. OF
TRANSNATIONAL L. 1 (1970) and Malawer, The Withdrawal of UNEF, 4 CORNELL
INT'L L. J. 25 (1970). The following quotes are instructive.
Under the Constitution the treaty-making power resides in the President and the
Senate, and when through their action a treaty is made and proclaimed it becomes
a law of the United States, and the courts can no more go behind it for the pur-
pose of annulling it in whole or in part than they can go behind an act of Congress.
United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181, 201 (1926).
While it has long been the rule that a treaty with Indians is to be construed so as to
carry out the Government's obligations in accordance with the fair understand-
ing of the Indians, we cannot, under the guise of interpretation, create presiden-
tial authority where there was none, nor rewrite congressional acts so as to make
them mean something they obviously were not intended to mean.
Confederated Bands of Ute Indians v. United States, 330 U.S. 169, 179 (1947).
RIn interpreting treaties and agreements with the Indians [,] they are to be con-
strued, so far as possible, in the sense in which the Indians understood them, and
"in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect
the interests of a dependent people." [citing cases]. But even Indian treties can-
not be rewritten or expanded beyond their clear terms to remedy a claimed in-
justice or to achieve the asserted understanding of the parties.
Choctaw Nations of Indians v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 432 (1943).
"The language used in treaties with the Indians should never be construed to their
prejudice." But the context shows that the Justice meant no more than that the
language should be construed in accordance with the tenor of the treaty. That, we
think, is the rule which this Court has applied consistently to Indian treaties. We
attempt to determine what the parties meant by the treaty. We stop short of vary-
ing its terms to meet alleged injustices. Such generosity, if any may be called for in
the relations between the United States and the Indians, is for the Congress.
Northwestern Bands of Shoshone Indians v. United States, 324 U.S. 335, 353 (1945).
The treaty is therefore a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of
1972] Md. and Supreme Court Treaty Interpretation
guidelines on treaty interpretation. Action is needed to solve the
paradox of the Supreme Court jurisprudence on treaty interpretation
and to alleviate the dilemma that exists in federal-state judiciary
relations.
justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate
the Constitution of the United States. It is their duty to interpret it and ad-
minister it according to its terms. And it would be impossible for the Executive
Department of the government to conduct our foreign relations with any advan-
tage to the country, and fulfill the duties which the Constitution has imposed upon
it, if every court in the country was authorized to inquire and decide whether
the person who ratified the treaty on behalf of a foreign nation had the power,
by its Constitution and laws, to make the engagements into which he entered.
Nor can the plaintiff's claim be supported unless he can maintain that a
court of justice may inquire whether the President and Senate were not mistaken
as to the authority of the Spanish monarch in this respect; or knowingly sanc-
tioned an act of injustice committed by him upon an individual in violation of the
laws of Spain.
Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
Dr. Kleiner has stated the following:
Hundreds of treaties were entered into between the United States and the
various Indian nations during the nineteenth century. Nearly a third were treaties
of peace; the rest were treaties for land cession. Treaties did not seem to hinder
Federal legislative competence with respect to Indians. In 1871 Congress uni-
laterally changed its method of dealing with Indian tribes from treaty to statute.
Kleiner, United States Laws on American Indians, 77 CASE AND COMMENTS No. 4, at 3, 5
(1972).
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